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I. Introduction
A primary rationale given by many countries adopting regimes of ex-
change rate stabilization, be it a peg or a full currency union, is the goal
of promoting more international trade. Despite a long literature failing
to show a robust linkage between exchange rate variance and trade,
Rose (2000) stimulated a great deal of interest by finding that the adop-
tion of a currency union historically has tended to raise bilateral trade
by a large amount.
1 Subsequent literature generally has supported the
statistical significance, if not the magnitude, of this result.
2 In addition,
Klein and Shambaugh (2006) find that adopting a direct peg, in which a
country fixes its exchange rate to a particular trading partner, also has a
significant effect to raise bilateral trade.
T h i sp a p e rs t u d i e st h ee f f e c to fe x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e so nb i l a t e r a l
trade by decomposing trade into its extensive and intensive margins,
wheretheextensivemarginisanincreaseinthenumberoffirmsorprod-
ucts and the intensive margin is a rise in the value of trade by existing
firms or products. Recent research in trade theory has emphasized this
distinction, as it has implications for the welfare gains of trade and re-
source allocation. The empirical section of this paper conducts panel
gravity regressions, analogous to those of Rose (2000) and Klein and
Shambaugh (2006), but it considers three distinct independent variables:
bilateral trade flows, the extensive margin of bilateral trade, and the in-
tensive margin.Theextensive andintensive marginsaremeasuredusing
theNBER/UNdatabasepreparedbyRobertFeenstraandRobertLipsey,
which records bilateral trade flows at a four‐digit disaggregated goods
level. This data set covers the years 1962–2000, so it does not include the
recentexperience of the European Monetary Union (Feenstra et al. 2005).
Consequently, the results for currency unions, like those in Rose (2000),
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978‐0‐226‐10732‐5/2009/2008‐0050$10.00are based on a set of countries that are mostly small or poor, so implica-
tions are not directly applicable to European Monetary Union mem-
bers. The exchange rate regime classifications used are from Klein
and Shambaugh (2008).
The empirical work first confirms two stylized facts from previous
work: both currency unions and direct pegs raise trade flows, and the
effect is somewhat larger for currency unions than for pegs. Of greater
novelty are two additional stylized facts that are uncovered. Currency
unions have a large and statistically significant effect at the extensive
margin, but they have a small and insignificant effect at the intensive
margin. In contrast, direct pegs exhibit just the opposite pattern: a small
and insignificant effect at the extensive margin, but a significant effect
at the intensive margin. Our overall empirical conclusion, then, is that,
while currency unions and direct pegs both raise trade flows, they ap-
pear to work through distinct channels. These findings offer some new
insight into the role of exchange rate regimes in facilitating trade that is
useful for discriminating among alternative theories.
3
The theoretical section of this paper develops a potential explanation
for these empirical findings. It builds upon developments in interna-
tional macroeconomics in modeling how exchange rate uncertainty af-
fects the price setting of firms under price stickiness. But it also utilizes
some recent developments in trade theory that model firm entry deci-
sions in the face of fixed costs.
4 As a result, this paper is among the very
first to model how exchange rate uncertainty affects firm entry deci-
sions under sticky prices.
5 The model is a stochastic general equilibrium
monetary model with two symmetric countries. It specifies that prices
must be set before the monetary shocks driving exchange rates are
known, and it specifies that the entry decision must be made yet even
earlier, one period prior to the price setting. Motivated by empirical evi-
dence, we assume that, while both pegs and currency unions are cred-
ible in eliminating exchange rate volatility over the horizon that prices
are preset, only a currency union is credible for the longer horizon over
which entry decisions must be determined.
As a result, both regimes lower the riskiness of foreign sales when the
firm is setting price, which results in lower export prices and higher
export sales, consistent with our first empirical fact. However, the exis-
tence of a peg when a firm is deciding on entry is not very informative
about the exchange rate behavior in the later period when export sales
take place. As a result, only the currency union encourages more entry
relative to a freely floating exchange rate regime. This is consistent with
the last two of our empirical facts above. In fact, the model predicts that
Bergin and Lin 202100% of the rise in trade volume when a currency union eliminates ex-
change rate uncertainty comes at the extensive margin, with no impact
on the intensive margin. This is somewhat surprising since one might
have expected the risk premium in prices, used by firms to hedge
against exchange rate uncertainty in price setting, could also help hedge
against the effects of risk on the entry decision. But this is not the case.
Finally, the fact that currency unions induce a larger entry of new vari-
eties interacts with love for variety in preferences to stimulate more ex-
penditure on exported goods than under a peg, which results in a larger
impact of currency unions on overall trade flows. This is consistent with
the second of our four empirical facts.
In related work, Baldwin, Skudelny, and Taglioni (2005) propose a
model of how a reduction in exchange rate uncertainty under a cur-
rency union stimulates the extensive margin. Our paper differs in that
it models the effect of uncertainty from first principles, tracing how it
affects price setting and entry decisions.
6 In addition, our model distin-
guishes between the effects of reducing exchange rate uncertainty
through direct pegs versus currency unions.
II. Empirical Analysis
The study uses a panel data set that covers 148 countries’ bilateral ex-
ports at an annual frequency from 1973 to 2000. Our range of counties
and the end date of our sample are determined by the availability of the
disaggregated trade data used to measure the extensive margin. These
data come from the NBER‐UN World Trade Data set, developed by
Feenstra and Lipsey and documented in Feenstra et al. (2005). This data
setcomputesannualbilateraltradeflowsatthefour‐digitStandardInter-
nationalTradeClassification(SITC) byperforming a seriesofadjustments
on UN trade data.
7 For data on exchange rate regime classifications, we
use the classifications in Klein and Shambaugh (2006, 2008). Although
the bilateral trade data start earlier than 1973 (in 1962), we follow Klein
andShambaughinfocusingonthepost–BrettonWoodsperiod.Asthey
note, the pegs in Bretton Woods were part of a multilateral system with
extensivecapitalcontrolsandsoarequitedifferentfrommorecontempo-
rary unilateral pegs. Nonetheless, we will show in supplementary tables
that our results are quite robust to a longer sample range. Geographic
data needed for our regressions come from the data set of Rose (2004).
The definition of a peg in this data set requires that the bilateral ex-
change rate stay within a 2% band at the end of each month the entire
year, and direct peg occurs when it can be identified in addition that
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50% of the countries in the sample are involved in a peg with some
other country. Many of these are a developing country pegging to an
industrialized one. There is a great deal of regime switching among
these countries. Klein and Shambaugh (2008) note that 44% of pegs last
for only 1 year.
8 Interestingly, there is also a high rate of regime change
among floats; 36% of floats spells also last for only 1 year.
The definition of a currency union is a strict one, as in Rose (2000), that
currencies trade at a one‐to‐one rate. As noted in Klein and Shambaugh
(2008), the currency unions usually involve countries that are small or
poor. In our sample, there are 65 country pairs that show a currency
union relationship.
9 These relationships are much more stable than pegs
inthatonlynineofthe65countrypairsexhibitedachangeinregimedur-
ing the entire 28‐year sample.
Following Hummels and Klenow (2005), the extensive margin is
measured in a manner consistent with consumer price theory by adapt-
ing the methodology in Feenstra (1994). The extensive margin of exports
from country j to country m, denoted by EMj
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change over time. With the same level of share of world exports to
country m at time t, the measurement implies that country j would have
a higher extensive margin measure if it exported many different cate-
gories of products to country m, whereas it would have a higher inten-
sive margin if country j only exported a few categories to country m.
Separate panel regressions are run by regressing the extensive mar-
gin, the intensive margin, and the exporter’st o t a ls h a r eo nt h ee x -
change rate regime variables, as well as the standard set of gravity
model variables. The benchmark regressions take the form:
Yjm;t ¼ β0 þ β1CUjm;t þ β2Pegjm;t þ β3IdPegjm;t þ β4ex varjm;t
þ λXjm;t þ γFjm þ ϕt þ κexp þ ωimp þ εjm;t: ð4Þ
The model is estimated based on ordinary least squares with robust
standard errors clustered at the export pair level, where j is the exporter
and m is the importer. The dependent variables (Yjm;t) will be either the
logarithmofcountryj’sextensivemarginofexportstocountrym,thelog-
arithm of country j’s intensive margin, or the logarithm of share of world
exports. Regressors include dummies for the exchange rate regime:
CUjm;t for a currency union, Pegjm;t for and direct peg, and IdPegjm;t
for an indirect peg. The regressor ex varjm;t is a measure of volatility of
the nominal exchange rate between countries j and m, which is the stan-
dard deviation of the first difference of the logarithm of the monthly ex-
changeratebetweenthetwocountries.Next,Xjm;t isasetofvariablesthat
vary over time, which includes the logarithm of real GDP per capita of
exporter j relative to real GDP per capita of all countries who export to
importer m, logarithm of exporter j’s population relative to real GDP per
capita of all countries who export to importer m, a dummy variable in-
dicating whether the two countries had a free trade agreement at time t,
and a dummy variable for pairs currently in colonial relationship. In ad-
dition,Fjm isasetofvariablesthatdonotvaryovertime,suchastheloga-
rithm of distance between country j and m, a common language dummy,
a land border dummy, and a dummy for pairs ever in colonial relation-
ship. Also included is a time effect, t, to control for time‐specific factors
such as global shocks or business cycles.
To avoid omitting variables that may affect bilateral trade, two vectors
of dummy variables, exp and imp, are included, indicating exporter and
importer fixed effects. As Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) proposed,
country effects are included as controls for multilateral resistance. We
decided to use separate country fixed effectsforeach country as exporter
Exchange Rate Regimes and Extensive Margin of Trade 205a n di m p o r t e rb e c a u s e ,i nc o n t r a s tw i t ht h er e l a t e dl i t e r a t u r eo nt r a d e
flows, our dependent variable specifies the direction of trade.
10
Initial results arereported in table 1, covering the sample with country
fixed effects from 1973 to 2000. Currency union has a highly statistically
significanteffecttoraisebothoverallexportsandtheextensivemarginof
exports but has an insignificant (small negative) effect at the intensive
margin. In contrast, a direct peg has a significant effect to raise overall
trade and the intensive margin, but the effect at the extensive margin is
insignificant. The coefficients for currency union imply that a currency
union would raise the export share by 122% because of a 149% increase
in the extensive margin.
11 So allof the rise in trade comesatthe extensive
margin. A peg can increase export share by 26%, which comes from 25%
increase in the intensive margin of exports. So virtually all of the rise in
Table 1















































































































Observations 172,544 172,544 172,544
R
2 .64 .57 .74
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
Bergin and Lin 206trade comes at the intensive margin. In summary, there are four facts ob-
served for this data set. First, both exchange rate regimes raise bilateral
trade; but, second, currency unions have a larger effect. Third, currency
unions work at the extensive margin, while, fourth, direct pegs work at
the intensive margin.
Regarding other coefficients, exchange rate volatility does not have a
statistically significant effect on overall trade, echoing results in other
studies. The coefficients on indirectpeg are negative, which is somewhat
surprising. The standard gravity variables are generally significant and
of the expected sign.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) note that multilateral resistance
could change over time, indicating that the country fixed effects used
inthepreviousregressionarenotsufficientcontrols.Table2reportsresults
Table 2










































































































Observations 172,544 172,544 172,544
R
2 .68 .61 .76
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
Exchange Rate Regimes and Extensive Margin of Trade 207when we use country‐year fixed effects, where separate country fixed ef-
fects are included for each year in the panel regression. We will follow
KleinandShambaugh(2006)inusingthisspecificationasourbenchmark
result. Results are very similar to those reported above, where currency
union has a significant effect to raise overall trade and the extensive mar-
ginanddirectpegshavesignificanteffectsonoveralltradeandtheinten-
sive margin. However, the magnitude of currency union impacts is
somewhat smaller. Translating coefficients, a currency union raises the
overall trade share by 84%, raises the extensive margin 84%, and raises
the intensive margin 0%. A direct peg raises overall trade share by 25%,
the extensive margin by 0%, and the intensive margin by 25%. Again we
see that, while both exchange rate regimes raise overall trade, they are
entirely distinct in terms of the margins of trade through which they
work.
Next, consider the robustness of results to controlling for endogeneity
with instrumental variables estimation. One might be concerned that
exchange rate regimes could respond to an anticipated change in bilat-
eral trade rather than bilateral trade responding to a change in the ex-
change rate regime. The instrumental variable used here is the same as
in Klein and Shambaugh (2006), the percentage of countries in country
j’s region that are directly pegged with country i for a given pair of
countries i and j. The instrument predicts whether a country pegs its
currency and thereby can indirectly affect trade, but it will have no di-
rect impact on trade itself. Table 3 shows that results are very similar to
those reported above. In particular, the pattern of significance for cur-
rency unions and pegs is unchanged. The magnitude of the currency
union coefficient in table 3 is very close to that from table 1, and the
direct peg coefficient is about twice as large as in table 1.
Finally, table 4 shows results for estimating over the date range prior
to Bretton Woods, 1962–2000. Results again are very similar, the only
exception being that, in the case of the instrumental variable estimation,
the direct peg loses its significance on the overall export share.
III. Theoretical Analysis
The purpose of this section is to study theoretically the effect of ex-
change rate uncertainty on firms’ decisions to enter export markets.
We use a stochastic general equilibrium model of two symmetric coun-
tries with price stickiness and fixed costs of entry into both domestic
and export markets. Uncertainty comes from monetary shocks in both
countries, and we assume balanced trade.
12 To permit a closed‐form
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will abstract from firm heterogeneity; however, the concluding section
will conjecture on heterogeneity’s likely implications for the paper’s re-
sults. A key element in this analysis will be prices that need to be preset
before firms observe the shocks determining exchange rates. Given un-
certain valuation of profits from foreign sales and assuming preferences
where consumption and leisure are substitutes, firms will hedge against
risk by setting higher prices on exported goods. This risk premium in
prices has implications similar to iceberg trade costs in more standard
trade models. Higher export prices will discourage demand for traded
goods and reduce the volumeoftrade.Thiseffectappliesequallytoallex-
change rate regimes that lower exchange rate volatility, currency union
and direct peg alike. To distinguish between these two regimes, we draw
Table 3














































































































Observations 172,544 172,544 172,544
R
2 .64 .57 .74
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
Exchange Rate Regimes and Extensive Margin of Trade 209on the empirical observation that about half of new pegs do not survive
more than 1 year, whereas currency unions tend to last many years. We
model the effect this has on the entry decision by assuming that the fixed
cost must be paid earlier than price setting when there is still uncertainty
about the exchange rate regime that will prevail when sales take place.
For the sake of clarity in describing the sequence of events and infor-
mation sets, we specify a three‐period model. The final period (t2)i s
when production and all sales take place. This is the period where the
shocks are revealed that determine the equilibrium values of the ex-
change rate, wages, and production. In the period previous (t1), firms
must choose their prices for domestic and foreign sales based upon their
expectations for shocks and equilibrium values the subsequent period.
The firms’ decisiontoentera market must be madeinthe periodprevious
Table 4




IV, Panel Regression with
Country Fixed Effects




































































































































































































2 .62 .57 .73 .62 .57 .73
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
Bergin and Lin 210to this (t0) based upon their expectations conditional on information in
this period. We assume that currency unions adopted in period t0 can
be expected to continue to exist in periods t1 and t2. By contrast, we as-
sumethat direct pegsadopted inperiod t0lastthrough periodt1butthen
are expected to fail by the time period t2 begins. Likewise, direct pegs
adopted in period t1 are expected to lastuntil the endof period t2. To per-
mit an analytical solution, we assume firm expectations assign a zero
probability to a direct peg adoption ex ante.
13
While we use a three‐period characterization of the model for clarity,
an equivalent characterization (under independent and identically dis-
tributed [i.i.d.] shocks) that more naturally maps into our empirical
study would be as an infinite horizon of annual observations. Prices
are chosen at the beginning of each year, for sales later that same year,
and entry decisions are made 1 year ahead of time. Pegs adopted at the
beginning of the year are expected to last until the end of the year but
not until the next year. In this characterization, period t2 corresponds to
the end of the year, t1 to the beginning of the year, and t0 to the end of
the previous year. In the notation below, the dating convention will be
to date variables by the period in which they are determined.
A. Households
There is a continuum of identical households in each of the two coun-
tries, designated home and foreign, and the population in each country
is normalized to one. A representative household in the home country
consumes nH varieties of home goods and nF v a r i e t i e so fg o o d se x -
ported from the foreign country. It supplies labor, receives profits from
owning an equal proportion of domestic firms, and holds home money
through a cash in advance constraint. The representative household of
the home country maximizes the expectation of utility
UðCt2; lt2Þð 5Þ
in period 2, where C is aggregate consumption, l is leisure, and it is as-
sumed that consumption and leisure are substitutes. Aggregate con-
sumption is defined as a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
aggregator, with a potentially distinct elasticity between home and for-
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CHt2   n










CFt2   n










for homogeneous firms. Following Benassy (1996), the parameter γ indi-
cates the degree of love for variety, in that γ   1 represents the marginal
utility gain from spreading a given amount of consumption on a basket
that includes one additional good variety in a symmetric equilibrium.
Households hold and receive only domestic currency from the gov-
ernment. The cash‐in‐advance constraint is
14
Pt1Ct2 ¼ Mt2: ð8Þ
The budget constraint of the household in the home country is pre-
sented by
Pt1Ct2 ¼ Wt2Lt2 þ Πt2 ¼ Mt2; ð9Þ
where W is the nominal wage rate and Π is the household’s ownership
income from the activity of firms. The first‐order condition of the con-





Price indexes are defined as usual for each range of varieties in cor-

































for homogeneous firms, where P is the aggregate domestic country price
level, PH is the price index of the home good, and PF is the price (to
Bergin and Lin 212domestic residents) of the imported foreign good. These imply relative
























Analogous conditions apply to the foreign country. Note that, under
symmetry, nHt0 ¼ n 
Ft0 and n 
Ht0 ¼ nFt0.
B. Firms’ Behavior
Production technology is assumed to be linear in labor:
yHt2ðiÞ¼ALHt2ðiÞ; ð15Þ
where A represents productivity, which is assumed to be deterministic
and homogeneous across firms. Firms pay an equilibrium wage rate, W,
for each unit of labor. To produce for domestic sale, firms must also pay
a fixed cost, F, in domestic labor units. To export, firms pay an iceberg
cost, τ, as well as commit to pay a fixed cost, F , which is in units of
domestic labor. Firms must precommit to paying both types of fixed
costs in period t0. It is assumed that the fixed cost of entering the do-
mestic market is lower than that of entering the export market (F < F )
due to the additional costs of language, product standards, legal bar-
riers, and transactions costs associated with currency conversion.
Firms must set prices in the currency of the buyer in period t1 for
sales in period t2 before knowing the realization of monetary shocks.
Each firm would maximize the expected market value of total nominal
profits from domestic and exported markets. Since households are the
owners of firms, uncertain profits across states are discounted using the
marginal utility of consumption.
A home firm’s problem is to maximize its expected profits:
max Et1½ucπHðiÞþucπ 
HðiÞ ; ð16Þ















Að1   τÞ
i
c 
Ht2ðiÞ Wt2F : ð18Þ
Using demand conditions from above, the optimal price setting condi-
tions are (see the appendix for derivations)
pHt1ðiÞ¼
  μ





















  : ð20Þ
Next, consider firm entry decisions. Firms enter until profit exceeds
the fixed cost in expectations, evaluated in terms of marginal utility.
Consider entry of home firms into the foreign market:
Et0½uct2π 
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  Et0½uct2Wt2 F  ¼ 0:
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Bergin and Lin 214C. Equilibrium Nominal Exchange Rate Determination
The equilibrium nominal exchange rate can be derived explicitly under
the assumption of a fully symmetric structure. Foreign exchange mar-
ket clearing requires that excess supply of the two currencies must be
zero in equilibrium. Under the assumption of balanced trade, equate
the value of imports to the value of export revenue:
PFt1CFt2   st2P 
Ht1C 
Ht2 ¼ 0: ð24Þ
Assume full symmetry across countries, so PFt1 ¼ P 
Ht1 and Pt1 ¼ P 
t1.






The equilibrium nominal exchange rate is equal to the ratio of money
supplies. Clearly, this is a very simple exchange rate equation, but it
captures the relationship between nominal exchange rate and funda-
mentals directly.
In addition, it is assumed that the home and foreign money supplies,
M and M , are both log‐normally distributed, which is defined by
logðMÞ¼m þ ε; ð26Þ










Thedistributionof Mand M  isjointlysymmetric,withacorrelationthat
equalsone underapeg and acurrencyunion and acorrelationthatequals
zero under pure float. This implies that m ¼ m  and σ2
m ¼ σ 2
m ¼ σ2;t h u s
the uncertainty of the nominal exchange rate under a pure float comes







D. Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes on Price Setting
The firm price setting behavior in this model is identical to that devel-
oped in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000). Using equations (10) and
Exchange Rate Regimes and Extensive Margin of Trade 215(25) to substitute for the endogenous wage and exchange rate in the
price setting equations (19) and (20):
pHt1ðiÞ¼
  μ









μ   1
  Pt1





Consider, first, the case of a floating exchange rate, where the money
supplies of the two countries move independently. Under the assump-
tion of substitutability between co n s u m p t i o na n dl e i s u r e ,i tm u s tb e
that Et1½ult2Mt2  < Et1½ult2M 
t2 : Intuitively, a shock raising home money
supply will raise home consumption but not foreign consumption be-
cause the cash‐in‐advance constraint for home money involves only
home consumption. Because home consumption includes both home
and foreign goods, this will lower both home labor and foreign labor.
Given that consumption and leisure are substitutes, the rise in home
consumption will help offset the rise in the marginal utility of leisure
when it is due to a home money rise. This is not true for a rise in foreign
money, which lowers home leisure but does not raise home consump-
tion. As a result, the home marginal utility of leisure has a smaller co-
variance with home money than it does with foreign money, and
Et1½ult2Mt2  < Et1½ult2M 
t2 : Another way to view this is that the rise in
the wage rate needed to clear the money market is higher for a foreign
money shock than a home money shock, so that the expected costs of
production rise more for a foreign money shock. The higher price repre-
sents a risk premium associated with sales abroad. This, along with the
fact that exporters must pay the iceberg trade cost, ensures that export
prices are higher than domestic goods prices. Of course, if we were to
assume instead that consumption and leisure were not substitutes, this
result would change. See the appendix of Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2000) for a proof of this point.
Next consider the case where exchange rates are fixed, which re-
quires that home and foreign money supplies are perfectly correlated.
This condition is true for both direct pegs and currency unions. Now a
rise in money supply (home and foreign together) will always raise
home consumption along with the fall in leisure. So Et1½ult2Mt2 ¼
Et1½ult2M 
t2 ; and there is no risk premium raising export prices over do-
mestic prices; export prices will be higheronly due to icebergtrade costs.
Given that shocks are i.i.d. and prices are preset, conditional on
knowledge of the exchange rate regime, prices will not be time‐varying.
Bergin and Lin 216Let us indicate these constant prices with overbars and summarize the













where CU stands for currency union, and peg stands for direct peg, as
in the empirical section of the paper.
E. Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes on Number of Firms
We next study the implications of the entry conditions (22) and (23) un-
der alternative exchange rate regimes. Consider first a currency union.
In this case, it is known already in period t0 that there will be no ex-
change rate movements in period t2, so firms expect that prices set in
period t1willcorrespondtothe resultderivedaboveforafixedexchange












CU Et0½uct2Mt2 ðp 
H; CUðiÞÞ




(See the appendix for the derivation.) The exponent depends on the de-
greeofloveofvariety,γ,aswellastheaggregateelasticityofsubstitution
between home and foreign goods, ϕ. If we assume no love for variety
(γ ¼ 1), then the exponent takes the value of one and disappears. Under
the calibration consistent with Dixit‐Stiglitz preferences (γ ¼ μ=ðμ   1Þ;
where μ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties), this exponent
takes the value ðμ   1Þ=ðμ   ϕÞ. The corresponding condition for the do-
mesticnumberoffirmsisanalogous.Itturnsouttobeveryconvenientto
expressthetwoasaratio,asseveraltermscommonacrossthetwocancel
under symmetry across countries (including some expectations difficult








 ð1 ϕÞ=½γð1 ϕÞþϕ  
F 
F




1   τ
 ð1 ϕÞ=½γð1 ϕÞþϕ  
F
F 
 1=½γþð1 γÞϕ 
: ð33Þ
Thisexpressioncanbeviewedastheproductoftwoterms,thefirstbeing
a relative price term and the second a relative fixed cost term. The ex-
ponent on the price term can take the value of 1  ϕ for the case of
no love for variety or the value of ðμ   1Þð1   ϕÞ=ðμ   ϕÞ for the case
Exchange Rate Regimes and Extensive Margin of Trade 217of Dixit‐Stiglitz preferences, both of which will be negative for values of
ϕ > 1.Inthecaseofacurrencyunion,thepricesetbyfirmsisthesamein
both markets, except for the iceberg cost, so entry in the export market is
lower than domestic entry due only to the presence of iceberg and fixed
trade costs.












float Et0½uct2Mt2 ½p 
H; float; fðiÞ 













 ð1 ϕÞ=½γð1 ϕÞþϕ  F 
F
 1=½γþð1 γÞϕ 
: ð35Þ
As seen above, there is a large gap between export and domestic price










1   τ
:
This implies that a float will discourage entry in the export market rel-
ative to domestic entry.
Finally,weconsiderthecaseofadirectpeg.Becausefirmsexpectapeg
adopted in period t0 to collapse by period t2, the expectation in period t0
for prices in t1 are the same prices as under a float. Hence, the number of












float Et0½uct2Mt2 ½p 
H; floatðiÞ 








   
p 
H; floatðiÞ=pH; floatðiÞ
 1 ϕ=ðF =FÞ
 1=½γþð1 γÞϕ : ð37Þ
As a result, we can conclude the following relationship of entry among












; for ϕ > 1 and γ   ϕ=ðϕ   1Þ:
Bergin and Lin 218F. Implications for Export Share and the Extensive and Intensive Margins
Finally, we are ready to decompose the effects of exchange rate regimes
into extensive and intensive margins. As this is a two‐country model,
whereas the data set is from a multicountry setting, we must work a bit
to construct theoretical measures of the trade margins that approximate
those in the empirical work. The extensive margin in the empirical sec-
tion scales the number of products traded between two countries by the
trade in products with all countries; in our two‐country world, we will
scale the number of firms traded by the number of all firms that sell












In keeping with this measure of the extensive margin, we will measure
the export share as the ratio of the value of home exports to the foreign





































This implies the appropriate measure of the intensive margin, sales per






































First, we wish to show that the export share rises for a peg and for a
currency union as compared to a float but that the effect is larger for a








  1 ϕ
¼


















  ð1 ϕÞð1 γÞ









































We know from the discussion of price setting that the second term is
greater than unity, reflecting the fact that under a float export prices
are higher than domestic prices due to risk, whereas under a currency
union this is not true. Lower export prices will raise export revenues
provided demand is elastic. We know from the discussion of extensive
margins that the first term is greater than unity provided that there is
love for variety. So we have two reasons why trade is higher under a
currency union: lower export prices relative to domestic prices and love
of variety.
Foradirectpeg,firm‐levelpricesettingisthesameasacurrencyunion,































by a factor proportional to the rise in the extensive margin, with the pro-
portionality depending on love for variety.
Next, decompose the rise in export share into extensive and intensive


























So the percentage rise in export share from float to currency union is
equal to the percentage rise in the extensive margin. That is, 100% of
Bergin and Lin 220the rise in trade is attributable to the extensive margin, and none is due
to the intensive margin. This result is consistent with our empirical
finding. Nonetheless, it is somewhat surprising. Given that firms hedge
against exchange rate risk in price setting with a risk premium raising
prices, one might expect that this would also help hedge against the ef-
fects of exchange rate risk on the entry decision. But this is not the case.
The story is quite different for a direct peg. Given that the extensive
margin is unchanged from a float to a direct peg, by definition, the rise
in export share is all due to the intensive margin. This again corresponds
to our empirical finding.
IV. Conclusion
This paper finds that currency unions and direct pegs raise trade vol-
ume through distinct channels. Panel data analysis of the period 1973–
2000 indicates that currency unions have raised trade largely at the
extensive margin, the entry of new firms or products. In contrast, direct
pegs have raised trade almost entirely at the intensive margin, in-
creased trade in existing products. A theoretical model, featuring price
stickiness and firm entry under uncertainty, is developed to understand
this finding. Because both regimes provide exchange rate stability over
the horizon of price setting, they lead to lower export prices and greater
demand for exports. But, because currency unions are more credible at
a longer horizon, they encourage firms to make the longer‐term invest-
ment needed to enter a new market.
Our model does not rule out the possibility that adopting a currency
union could additionally expand thee x t e n s i v em a r g i nb ya f f e c t i n g
fixed costs. These could involve deterministic effects, such as the elim-
ination of currency conversion or other transactions costs, which would
lower the fixed cost F . In addition, the model could be extended to
consider fixed costs that themselves are affected by exchange rate risk,
such as entry into foreign markets committing to fixed expenditures in
foreign labor units in future periods. The fixed costs term, F , then be-
comes stochastic, and its expected value could fall under exchange rate
stabilization, encouraging entry.
This model abstracted from firm heterogeneity in order to get a
closed‐form solution under uncertainty for the number of firms. If firms
were heterogeneous in terms of their productivity levels, this likely
would work in the opposite direction of explaining the higher rise in ex-
ports under a currency union compared to a direct peg. Since a currency
union implies a larger extensive margin effect, the new entrants would
Exchange Rate Regimes and Extensive Margin of Trade 221systematically have lower productivity than incumbent firms. This
would lower the average productivity of market participants and raise
the export price index, which would limit the increase in aggregate trade
volume.
Appendix
Derivation of Optimal Price Setting for Exports
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:
Now we need to study the expectation of price setting. Taking expec-
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Iterate expectations, under the assumptions about shocks and policy
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Et2½uct2Wt2 F   1=½γþð1 γÞϕ 
;
which is equation (32) in the text. Analogously, for the number of
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:
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Start again with equation (22), but under the information set that you
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Now, we need to study the expectation of price setting. Taking expecta-
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Et2½uct2Wt2 F  o1=½γþð1 γÞϕ 
;
which is equation (34) in the text.
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:
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1. Regarding exchange rate stability, see, e.g., Cushman (1983) and Klein (1990).
2. There is an extensive literature on this subject. For a sampling of supporting evidence,
seeRoseandvanWincoop(2001),FrankelandRose(2002),andGlickandRose(2002).Fora
sampling of critiques, see Persson (2001) and Nitsch (2002). See Baldwin (2006) for a useful
survey.
3. Related to this work, Kehoe and Ruhl (2003), Baldwin and Di Nino (2006), and Bergin
and Glick(2007) findthat, instudies of the specific caseof theeuroarea,thereappears to be
a significant effect on the extensive margin. This study agrees with this point, though for a
different set of countries, and it goes on to find a contrasting result for direct pegs.
4. Entryherecanbeinterpretedeitherasadditionalfirmsoradditionalproductlines.We
do not explicitly model multiproduct firms as was done in Bernard, Redding, and Schott
(2006).
5. This project differs from other prominent research in the field. Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) show how to combine recent developments in trade theory with a macroeconomic
model. But that model focuses on the dynamic response to real shocks; it does not include
money, nominal exchange rates, or the nominal rigidities needed to study the real effects of
exchange rate regimes. Naknoi (2008) is the first to have a monetary model with endoge-
noustradabilityandnominalstickiness.However,itstudies an entirelydifferentissue,trying
to explain the source of exchange rate variability rather than how exchange rate risk affects
entry decisions. Kumhof, Laxton, and Naknoi (2007) is the first study to integrate trade
theory and trade frictions into a monetary model that is usable for policy analysis, doing
soinaveryrichdynamicsetting.However,thispaperagainstudiesadifferentissuethan
the present project, as it focuses on how exchange rate movements induce costly adjust-
mentsintradeflows,wheretherealcostsofadjustmentimposeawelfare loss;it doesnot
study the issue of special interest here, regarding how exchange rate variability has level
effects on the mean level of trade.
6. In contrast, Baldwin (2005) introduces exchange rate uncertainty in a more ad hoc
manner by introducing the variance of exchange rates as a term in a firm loss function.
Further,hedoesnotstudyhowuncertaintyaffectstradeandentrybyaffectingprice‐setting
decisions.
7. It is noted that the data purchased from the United Nations for the period 1984–2000
only had values in excess of $100,000 for each bilateral flow. To be consistent, the cutoff of
exports in this study is set as $100,000, which implies that goods are considered nontrad-
able if an export value of the category is less than $100,000.
8. They also note that, for those pegs surviving the first couple years, the conditional
probability of switching in future years falls dramatically. This paper does not address the
interesting question that long‐lived pegs might differ systematically from short‐lived
pegs.
9. The list of countries involved in these pairs are Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Gabon,
Guatemala,GuineaBissau,India,Ireland,Kiribati,Liberia,Madagascar,Mauritania,Niger,
Panama, Senegal, Togo, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
10. Country‐pair fixed effects could be useful if trade resistance is bilateral rather than
multilateral in nature.But we do not implement this in the estimation as it would eliminate
cross‐sectional variation in the panel, leaving only time series variation. Country pairs that
havenoregimeswitchfortheentiresampleperioddonotyieldinformationintheestimate.
In the study of the impacts of currency union, we can even less afford to sacrifice cross‐
sectional information. There are 65 country pairs that ever had a currency union, but only
nine of them had a regime switch in the sample period.
11. The export share is 2.22 times higher (122%) because expð0:796Þ¼2:22; the exten-
sive margin is 2.49 times higher (149%) because expð0:913Þ¼2:49:
12. All our results hold also under the alternative assumption of complete asset mar-
kets, which replaces the balanced trade condition with the following risk‐sharing condi-
tion: uct2=u′ ¼ Et2P 
t1=Pt1. This implies that our results are robust to including assets usable
for exchange rate hedging.
Exchange Rate Regimes and Extensive Margin of Trade 22513. Given that Klein and Shambaugh (2008) show that a new peg has a 44% chance of
failing after its first year, a better assumption would be to model agent expectations for a
corresponding probability distribution of a peg and float in year t2, but this assumption
proved intractable for an analytical solution comparing across regimes.
14. The government is assumed to impose an identical tax at the end of the period after
all transactions are made. Money will then serve as a unit of account in each country, but
it does not have any distortionary effect by itself.
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